Touro Law Review
Volume 29

Number 3

Article 9

2013

Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for
Plaintiffs
Karen Blum
Erwin Chemerinsky
Martin A. Schwartz
Touro Law Center, mschwartz@tourolaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure
Commons

Recommended Citation
Blum, Karen; Chemerinsky, Erwin; and Schwartz, Martin A. (2013) "Qualified Immunity Developments: Not
Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs," Touro Law Review: Vol. 29: No. 3, Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Blum et al.: Qualified Immunity Developments

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS: NOT MUCH HOPE
LEFT FOR PLAINTIFFS
Karen Blum,* Erwin Chemerinsky,** & Martin A. Schwartz***
I.

INTRODUCTION: RECENT TRENDS IN THE QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY DEFENSE

This Article highlights important developments in the qualified immunity defense to Section 1983 claims. The focus is on recent
Supreme Court decisions and the fallout from such decisions in the
lower courts. First, however, we tackle the Supreme Court’s recent
expansion of absolute immunity to grand jury witnesses, and its impact on the application of qualified immunity. Second, consideration
is given to the Court’s newfound willingness to provide qualified
immunity to private actors engaged in conduct under color of state
law. Third, this Article discusses the continued effects of the Supreme Court’s reformulation of the qualified immunity analysis that
allows lower courts to skip deciding the merits of the constitutional
issue and jump to the question of whether the law was clearly established. Finally, this Article discusses recent decisions making it more
difficult for Section 1983 plaintiffs to establish that the federal law
was clearly established.
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Suffolk University Law School and an L.L.M. from Harvard. Professor Blum is a regular
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The Line Between Absolute and Qualified
Immunity Since Rehberg

PROFESSOR BLUM: A discussion about significant developments in the landscape of qualified immunity would not be complete without a few words about the Supreme Court’s most recent
case on absolute immunity and the impact that case might have on the
line drawn between absolute and qualified immunity in certain circumstances. This past Term, in Rehberg v. Paulk,1 the Supreme
Court clarified that the absolute immunity traditionally afforded to
trial witnesses2 extends to grand jury witnesses as well.3 Paulk was a
chief investigator in a local district attorney’s office.4 His testimony
before a grand jury on three different occasions was instrumental in
bringing about three different indictments against Mr. Rehberg, each
of which was ultimately dismissed.5 The Court rejected the argument
that Paulk should be treated as a “complaining witness,” and thus entitled to only qualified immunity.6 Noting that “testifying, whether
before a grand jury or at trial, was not the distinctive function performed by a complaining witness,”7 the Court concluded that a law
enforcement officer who testifies before a grand jury is performing a
function quite different from the function of applying for an arrest
warrant or the decision to initiate a prosecution.8 In holding that absolute immunity would protect grand jury witnesses from Section
1983 claims based on their grand jury testimony, the Court also
warned that “this rule may not be circumvented by claiming that a
Grand Jury witness conspired to present false testimony, or by using
evidence of the witness’s testimony to support any other § 1983
claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution.”9
1

132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012).
See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342 (1983) (holding that police officers are
entitled to absolute immunity for claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 arising out of allegedly perjured testimony at criminal trials).
3
Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1505. (“The factors that justify absolute immunity for trial witnesses apply with equal force to grand jury witnesses.”).
4
Id. at 1500.
5
Id. at 1501.
6
Id. at 1507 n.1 (distinguishing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-131 (1997), and
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-345 (1986), where only qualified immunity was provided to law enforcement officers for the filing of false affidavits).
7
Id. at 1507.
8
Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1507-08.
9
Id. at 1506.
2
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Although this language provides for a very expansive protection for
all claims based on grand jury witness testimony,10 two post-Rehberg
cases suggest windows that may be carved out for plaintiffs to pursue
Section 1983 claims, even in cases where grand jury testimony or
grand jury witnesses might be implicated.11
In Sankar v. City of New York,12 a district court in New York
noted that “Rehberg did not alter controlling Second Circuit (and
New York) law that an officer’s filing of a sworn complaint is sufficient to satisfy the initiation prong of a malicious prosecution
claim.”13 Thus, according to the court, the fact that the officer in this
case eventually provided grand jury testimony was not an “allpurpose shield from malicious prosecution.”14 The court stated that
in the event false testimony is provided during the filing of the affidavit, the swearing of the complaint, or the filing of the sworn complaint, an officer is entitled only to the protection of qualified immunity—even if the officer ultimately testifies at a grand jury
proceeding.15 Therefore, despite Rehberg’s language, which establishes absolute immunity from claims based on a conspiracy to provide false testimony,16 law enforcement officials should still be entitled to only qualified immunity for conduct performed as a
complaining witness prior to the giving of grand jury testimony.17
A second case, Frederick v. New York City,18 from the Southern District of New York, involved a motion to unseal selected por-

10
See, e.g., Jones v. Dalton, 867 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584 (D.N.J. 2012) (stating absolute immunity prohibited plaintiff from rebutting presumption of probable cause with evidence that
investigator made misrepresentations to grand jury).
11
See, e.g., Sankar v. City of New York, No. 07 CV 4726(RJD)(SMG), 2012 WL
2923236, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012) (granting only qualified immunity on malicious
prosecution claim for police officer who filed the initial sworn complaint and who also subsequently testified at grand jury); see also Frederick v. New York City, No. 11 Civ.
469(JPO), 2012 WL 4947806, at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2012) (suggesting grand jury testimony could be used to support a malicious prosecution claim against someone other than
the person who provided the grand jury testimony).
12
No. 07 CV 4726(RJD)(SMG), 2012 WL 2923236 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012).
13
Id. at *3.
14
Id.
15
Id. The grand jury testimony was inadmissible in that case; additionally, if the officer
did, in fact, do something prior to the grand jury to warrant a malicious prosecution claim,
the filing of the sworn complaint remains a basis for a malicious prosecution claim. Id.
16
Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1506 (“This rule may not be circumvented by claiming that a
Grand Jury witness conspired to present false testimony . . . .”).
17
Sankar, 2012 WL 2923236, at *3.
18
No. 11 Civ. 469(JPO), 2012 WL 4947806 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2012).
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tions of an eyewitness’ grand jury testimony to support a malicious
prosecution claim against the arresting officers, not the witness. 19 In
Frederick, after the witness of a drive by shooting told the police he
could not identify the shooter or driver and failed to identify anyone
in a photo array, the police brought the witness to a lineup where he
identified a man as the shooter.20 The man was arrested under the
theory that he was a driver, not a shooter; however, all charges were
dropped three days later.21
Here, the court drew an important distinction between the protection for a defendant’s grand jury testimony and the grand jury testimony of a different witness.22 The court stated that it would examine the testimony in camera to decide whether to unseal it, but if the
testimony was unsealed, it could only be used against the defendant
police officers in the malicious prosecution claim, not against the
grand jury witness.23 Thus, under Frederick, Rehberg does not preclude the use of grand jury testimony to support all Section 1983
claims, such as those against a police officer for malicious prosecution; Rehberg’s language that suggests grand jury testimony cannot
be used to support a Section 1983 claim merely prohibits the use of
such testimony against the witness who gave the testimony.24
The discussion of absolute immunity would not be complete
without mentioning a third case involving prosecutorial immunity.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Giraldo v. Kessler25 reflects a trend
towards expanding the scope of absolute immunity to protect conduct
associated not only with the prosecutorial function, but conduct typically viewed as investigative. In Giraldo, a New York state senator,
Hiram Monserrate, went to an emergency room with a female companion, Karla Giraldo, because of a cut on Giarldo’s eye.26 Despite
Monserrate’s claim that such injuries resulted from a glass accidentally breaking, domestic violence was suspected, and he was arrested.27 Giraldo supported Monserrate’s story and stated that she did

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id. at *1, *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Frederick, 2012 WL 4947806, at *14.
Id. at *3, *4.
694 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 164.
Id.
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not want to talk to the police.28 However, despite her unwillingness,
the police continued to question her at the hospital, brought her to a
police precinct to have her sign a statement, and brought her, against
her will, to the District Attorney’s office for two more hours of interrogation.29
In response, Giraldo filed a claim against the assistant district
attorneys who interrogated her, alleging that she was “ ‘unlawfully
detained, held against her will and maliciously interrogated’ . . . in
violation of her right to be free from unreasonable seizures . . . .”30
Although the prosecutors’ challenged conduct could be viewed as investigative, the court concluded that once Monserrate had been arrested, the questioning of Giraldo was clearly in preparation for and
in furtherance of the court proceeding, and thus the prosecutors were
entitled to absolute immunity for that conduct. 31 “While questioning
an important witness may accurately be described as investigative,
appellants’ interview was an integral part of appellants’ advocatory
function as prosecutors protected by absolute immunity.”32 This case
serves as an extreme application of absolute immunity because the
statements were made during an investigative stage, in which the police were still gathering evidence to support probable cause for an arrest they had made.33
DEAN CHEMERINSKY: The result of Giraldo illustrates the
recent trend by the Supreme Court to provide absolute immunity for
prosecutors. The Supreme Court has consistently drawn a distinction
between investigative and prosecutorial acts in terms of when there is
absolute immunity for prosecutors. For example, in the cases of
Burns v. Reed34 and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,35 the Court held that
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for prosecutorial, but
not for investigative or administrative acts.36 On the other hand, in

28

Id.
Id.
30
Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 164.
31
Id. at 167. The police said the arrest occurred before the intensive questioning of the
woman, and it was the reason they arrested Monserrate. Id. But, the police were still essentially in the investigative stage. Id.
32
Id.
33
Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 166-67.
34
500 U.S. 478 (1991).
35
509 U.S. 259 (1993).
36
Burns, 500 U.S. at 496; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 278.
29
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Van De Kamp v. Goldstein,37 a prosecutorial immunity case, the Supreme Court stated that even administrative decisions that affect subsequent events in the courtroom should be protected by absolute
prosecutorial immunity.38 Therefore, if certain acts relate to what is
going to occur at trial, then absolute prosecutorial immunity is available for prosecutorial conduct that relates to courtroom events.39
PROFESSOR BLUM: In sum, recent decisions from both the
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit suggest that absolute immunity will be applied quite broadly to protect grand jury witnesses from
civil rights claims based on their grand jury testimony, and to protect
prosecutors who engage in administrative or investigative conduct
that can be linked to their ultimate prosecutorial function in the courtroom.40
II.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND PRIVATE ACTORS SINCE
FILARSKY

Another recent development in the qualified immunity defense to Section 1983 claims is the Court’s recent grant of qualified
immunity to private actors working with the government. In Wyatt v.
Cole,41 the Supreme Court held that a private person, who had acted
in conjunction with a sheriff in invoking a state replevin statute to allegedly deprive the plaintiff of property without due process, was not
37

555 U.S. 335 (2009).
Id. at 349.
39
Ephraim Unell, A Right Not to Be Framed: Preserving Civil Liability of Prosecutors in
the Face of Absolute Immunity, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 955, 963 (2010) (“This decision
[Van De Kamp] has implications for cases addressing the investigatory function because, in
classifying administrative actions that relate to trial as protected prosecutorial functions, it
implies that investigatory acts, which by definition relate to trial, are protected as well.”). To
resolve this, the Court must consider earlier cases that drew a bright line distinction between
investigative and prosecutorial. See, e.g., Burns, 500 U.S. at 494 (“Absolute immunity is
designed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with
litigation . . . . That concern therefore justifies absolute prosecutorial immunity only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct.”); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276 (“A prosecutor may not shield his investigative work with the aegis of absolute immunity merely because, after a suspect is
eventually arrested, indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively described as preparation for a possible trial . . . . When the functions of prosecutors and detectives are the
same, as they were here, the immunity that protects them is also the same.”).
40
See generally Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting “All But the Plainly Incompetent” (and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1024, 1049
(2012) (discussing the Court’s trend in granting absolute and qualified immunity).
41
504 U.S. 158 (1992).
38
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entitled to the qualified immunity defense available to the government official.42 Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in Richardson v.
McKnight,43 held that prison guards who were employed by a private
prison management firm and assumed to be acting under color of
state law, were not entitled to qualified immunity from prisoners’
Section 1983 claims.44 The Court found no “ ‘firmly rooted’ tradition”45 of qualified immunity for privately employed prison guards
and no public policy concerns driving a qualified immunity defense
where private employees performed with no government supervision,
and private for-profit employers had market incentives to monitor
and avoid improper conduct by employees.46 In the Court’s last
Term, however, both Wyatt and Richardson were distinguished in
Filarsky v. Delia,47 which raised the issue of whether a private attorney retained by a city to conduct an internal affairs investigation was
entitled to qualified immunity.48
In Filarsky, a firefighter, Nicholas Delia, was suspected of
feigning illness to receive disability benefits and to get time off from
work to make improvements to his home.49 The city hired a private
attorney, who specialized in employment and labor law, to assist in
the investigation.50 The investigators and attorney went to Delia’s
house and, without a warrant, requested to go inside to search for evidence to prove he was not making improvements, but Delia refused.51 Claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, Delia
sued the city, the fire department, and the private attorney. 52 In response, the private attorney claimed qualified immunity. 53 The Court
held that the private attorney who had worked with the government in
such a capacity was entitled to the same immunity as a full-time em-

42

Id. at 168.
521 U.S. 399 (1997). The opinion was 5-4, with Justice Breyer writing for the majority,
joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. See also Alexander A. Reinert,
Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 483 (2011).
44
Richardson, 521 U.S. at 402.
45
Id. at 404.
46
Id. at 409.
47
132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012).
48
Id. at 1660.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1661.
53
Id.
43
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ployee of the government.54 Therefore, in some cases, a private actor
may be entitled to qualified immunity.55
Although some circuits had granted qualified immunity for
private citizens acting in the capacity of a public official prior to
Richardson,56 very few have since Richardson.57 Thus, since
Filarsky, it is unclear whether private actors acting under color of
state law and vulnerable to suit under Section 1983 are entitled to
qualified immunity.58
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: In my opinion, Richardson and
Filarsky are inconsistent because in Richardson the Court emphasized that there was no direct government supervision over the prison
guards,59 but that was true of the attorney in Filarsky as well.60 Additionally, there was profit-making incentive for the attorney in
Filarsky, assuming he was hired for profit, just as there was profit incentive for the prison company in Richardson, which was critical to
54

Id. at 1667-68.
Id. at 1667.
56
See, e.g., Eagon Through Eagon v. City of Elk City, 72 F.3d 1480, 1490 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding private citizen employed as event chairman was entitled to qualified immunity); Warner v. Grand Cnty., 57 F.3d 962, 967 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding private actor who
performed strip search of female detainee at request of sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity); Williams v. O’Leary, 55 F.3d 320, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding a private physician whose employer provided medical services to a prison was entitled to qualified immunity); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 929 (1st Cir. 1992) (“We hold, therefore, that
individuals . . . under contract with the government, are entitled to raise a qualified immunity
defense because they are the functional equivalent of public officials.”). But see Burrell v.
Bd. of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 970 F.2d 785, 796 (11th Cir. 1992) (qualified immunity not available for private actor who was “alleged to have acted in concert with public
officials for the sole purpose of depriving another of her constitutional rights”).
57
See, e.g., Toussie v. Powell, 323 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying qualified immunity for a private doctor who was working in a prison); see also Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d
510, 524 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding nurses working for private company that contracted to
work in prison were not entitled to qualified immunity based on Richardson); Jensen v. Lane
Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 576-80 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding no qualified immunity for privately
organized group of psychiatrists under contract to provide psychiatry services to mental
health detainees).
58
See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9A.03
(4th ed. Supp. 2012) (“Richardson v. McKnight seems like a harder case to distinguish from
Filarsky because, like Filarsky, the private prison guards in Richardson were carrying out
governmental responsibilities and presumably functioning akin to government employed
prison guards. Nevertheless, the Filarsky Court brushed Richardson aside as a ‘narrow’ decision.”).
59
Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408-09 (“[I]t never has held that the mere performance of a
governmental function could make the difference between unlimited § 1983 liability and
qualified immunity, especially for a private person who performs a job without government
supervision or direction.”).
60
Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1667.
55
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the Court’s rejection for the need of qualified immunity for the prison
guards.61 Thus, it appears, Filarsky may signal to a new trend: private actors working closely with the government may obtain qualified immunity based on the nature of their relationship with state officials, even if the private actor had independent profit incentive.62
PROFESSOR BLUM: A new trend is likely; but, on the other
hand, Filarsky may only be an exception to the general rule. Even
after Richardson and before Filarsky, a number of circuits granted
qualified immunity to private actors who were working closely with
the government in unique, extreme circumstances, such as a one-onone or closely monitored situation.63 However, it remains unclear
how the attorney in Filarsky is different from the private prison
guards in Richardson, and Filarsky lacks any of the unique circumstances found in previous exception cases. As a result, it will be important for practitioners in this area to track cases dealing with private actors sued under Section 1983 to see where the circuits stand
with regard to qualified immunity in this context post-Filarsky. For
example, in Currie v. Cundiff,64 one of the first post-Filarsky decisions to address the question of Filarsky’s impact on qualified immunity for private actors in other contexts, the district court found
that “the Supreme Court’s recent decision in [Filarsky] . . . makes
clear that qualified immunity is a defense available in this case,” 65 involving private health care workers employed by a private corporation under contract with the county to provide health care to inmates
at a county jail.66 It is truly difficult to distinguish private health care
workers from private prison guards, but the court obviously thought
that Filarsky was sending a message that qualified immunity was the
61

Id.
Id.
63
See, e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause of the closely monitored, non-profit interrelationship between FIA [Family Independence Agency] and
LSS [Lutheran Social Services], we hold that the LSS defendants may assert qualified immunity.”); Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[T]he psychiatrists, . . .
are for purposes of this case state actors performing in concert with the department. As such,
they are . . . eligible for the balm of qualified immunity.”); see also Murphy v. N.Y. Racing
Ass’n, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 489, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“NYRA is not really a market participant subject to competitive market pressures. As such, unlike the prison firm’s employees
[in Richardson], NYRA’s trustees need the encouragement and protection of qualified immunity.”).
64
No. 09-CV-866-MJR, 2012 WL 2711469 (S.D. Ill. July 8, 2012).
65
Id. at *4.
66
Id.
62
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default for private actors in such settings and Richardson was now
the exception. In contrast, in McCullum v. Tepe,67 the Sixth Circuit
held there was no qualified immunity for a physician who was employed by an independent, nonprofit organization to work in a county
prison as a psychiatrist.68 Therefore, even though Richardson involved a for-profit corporation, and the court clearly stated that qualified immunity for employees of for-profit corporations is unnecessary
because such corporations are likely to be self-monitoring, the physician’s employer’s non-profit status was not important to the Sixth
Circuit.69 McCullum is clearly inconsistent with Currie and other
post-Filarsky cases dealing with doctors working in prisons.70 There
will inevitably be a circuit split on this issue in the near future, and
the Supreme Court will undoubtedly revisit the question. Until then,
practicing attorneys should keep a close watch on their own circuits
to understand that circuit’s position on qualified immunity for private
actors after Filarksy.71

III.

THE NATURE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ANALYSIS POSTPEARSON

PROFESSOR BLUM: Another development worth following
in the world of qualified immunity is the approach taken by courts in
performing the qualified immunity analysis post-Pearson. In Saucier
v. Katz,72 the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to perform a
67

693 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 704.
69
Id.; Richardson, 521 U.S. at 407.
70
See, e.g., Ford v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 12 C 4558, 2013 WL 474494, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2013) (noting that “[w]hether a privately employed medical official working at a prison may invoke qualified immunity is an open question in the Seventh Circuit,”
but assuming the individual defendants could seek qualified immunity); Braswell v. Shoreline Fire Dep’t, No. C08-924-RSM, 2012 WL 1857858, at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2012)
(“Here, as in Filarsky, Dr. Somers is an individual hired by the government to assist in carrying out its work . . . . Accordingly, Dr. Somers is entitled to assert qualified immunity.”).
71
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Yet another interesting point raised by Filarsky is that the
Supreme Court rendered a qualified immunity decision without first determining whether
there was state action. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1668. The Court did the same thing in Richardson. 521 U.S. 399. Determining state action should be the first inquiry because it is an
essential element of a Section 1983 claim that the defendant acted under the color of state
law; if there is no state action, there is no immunity issue. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). However, despite this, the Court jumped straight to the immunity inquiry with no explanation.
See, e.g., Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1661-62; McCullum, 693 F.3d at 700.
72
533 U.S. 194 (2001).
68
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mandatory two-step analysis when deciding the issue of qualified
immunity.73 The analysis required, first, a determination of whether
the plaintiff had alleged a violation of a constitutional right under
current law: in essence, the “merits” or constitutional question.74 Only if the first inquiry were answered in the affirmative were courts to
turn to the second inquiry, the qualified immunity prong, which requires the plaintiff to show that the pertinent law was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct so that a reasonable official would have understood that his or her conduct violated that
clearly-established right.75
After much resistance to and criticism of Saucier’s mandatory
approach, the Supreme Court, in Pearson v. Callahan,76 provided
lower courts with the freedom to avoid the merits question, allowing
them instead to go directly to the second prong of the immunity inquiry.77 Pearson, decided in 2009, involved a confidential informant,
not a police officer, who went to a drug dealer’s house and signaled
the police to enter during a drug deal. 78 The police did not have a
warrant, but they contended that the consent given to the confidential
informant to enter the house operated as consent for the police.79
73

Id. at 200.
See id. (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged; second, assuming the violation is established, the question whether
the right was clearly established must be considered on a more specific level . . . .”).
75
Id. at 201-02 (emphasis added).
76
555 U.S. 223 (2009).
77
See, e.g., Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Pearson freed courts
from the mandatory nature of Saucier’s two-step process and allowed them to do the second,
and often dispositive, step first.”); see also Costello v. City of Burlington, 632 F.3d 41, 51
(2d Cir. 2011) (“Saucier’s two-step framework, while often helpful, is not mandatory . . . .”);
Ammons v. Wash. Dept. of Soc. & Health Serv., 648 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[W]e first examine the clearly established law with respect to the alleged Fourteenth
Amendment violation, and then determine whether the facts before us support such a violation.”); Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Because the answer to the
second of the two qualified immunity inquiries required by Pearson is plain, we . . . proceed
directly to the question of whether the specific right upon which the claim hinges was clearly
established . . . .”); Moldowan v. City of Warren, 570 F.3d 698, 720 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In
light of Pearson, . . . we are free to consider those questions in whatever order is appropriate
in light of the issues before us.”).
78
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227.
79
Id. at 229. The doctrine of consent-once-removed is accepted in virtually all circuits for
an undercover police officer who is allowed into a house and then signals other officers, but
there was some question among the circuits about whether the consent-once-removed doctrine applied when it was not a police officer but a confidential informant who was given the
consent. John F. Decker & Kathryn A. Idzik, Disguising a New Exception to the Warrant
Requirement: An Examination of the Consent-Once-Removed Doctrine and Its Hollow Justi74
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The Tenth Circuit held the police did not have consent to enter, the entry was a violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment law, and that the police were not entitled to qualified immunity.80 After asking the parties to brief the issue of whether Saucier’s
two-step analysis should continue to be mandatory, the Supreme
Court decided the first step was no longer mandatory, vacated the
Tenth Circuit’s decision, and granted the police officers qualified
immunity based exclusively on the second prong of the analysis.81
After Pearson, lower courts are free to use their discretion.82 Hence,
in appropriate cases, courts may go directly to the second prong.83
A.

The Supreme Court’s Avoidance of the Merits
Inquiry

Two recent post-Pearson cases reflect the tendency of the Supreme Court to favor bypassing the merits prong of the qualified immunity test, thus leaving unsettled constitutional issues raised in the
context of qualified immunity. First, in Messerschmidt v. Millender,84 a warrant was issued to search a home for any weapons and indicia of gang membership.85 Questions regarding the constitutionality of the search and warrant were raised.86 Although the incident that
fications, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 127, 156, 203 (2012) (noting that most jurisdictions have expressly adopted the doctrine of consent-once-removed and most other jurisdictions have developed a similar doctrine).
80
Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d, Pearson, 555 U.S.
223.
81
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 245. While this author agrees with much of the criticism that had
been directed towards Saucier’s mandatory “merits-first” approach to qualified immunity
analysis, Pearson was a case where it would have made sense to address the merits question.
The issue was not particularly fact driven, and it would have been helpful and instructive to
law enforcement agencies and citizens to have a definitive answer to the question of whether
consent given to a confidential informant operates as consent to officers entering the house
without a warrant. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declined to answer that first question,
instead going directly to the second question, and holding that there was qualified immunity.
Id.
82
Id. at 236 (“The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
case at hand.”).
83
Id.
84
132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012).
85
Id. at 1241.
86
Id. PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Messerschmidt looked at the whole picture in evaluating whether the officer acted in a reasonable manner for the purpose of qualified immunity.
Id.
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provided the grounds for the search warrant resembled a domestic
dispute—a young man shooting at his girlfriend after an argument escalated—the police viewed it as gang related.87 Additionally, even
though a particular gun was used, the warrant authorized the police to
search for any weapons and gang-related paraphernalia in the
house.88
The Supreme Court found the validity of the warrant under
the Fourth Amendment was not an issue.89 Rather, the question was
whether the police were entitled to immunity even if the warrant
should not have been issued.90 Here, the Court focused on the fact
that the officers acted appropriately in many respects;91 they sought
and got approval for the warrant application from a superior and a
deputy district attorney, and they went before a judge to get the warrant.92 Although the fact that a warrant was issued does not in itself
87

Id.
Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1243. DEAN CHEMERINSKY: The majority opinion is
that it would be permissible to do the search for the purpose of gathering evidence for impeachment only. Generally, the focus of searches by the police is gathering information to
use in a prosecution, and this is the only instance in which the Supreme Court has stated that
a search is permissible, but only to gather information for impeachment at trial. See id. at
1248 (stating that “evidence demonstrating Bowen’s membership in a gang might prove
helpful in impeaching Bowen or rebutting various defenses he could raise at trial”); see also
id. at 1256 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating the Court has never treated searches differently for impeachment purposes and to do so would allow the police to search almost anyone
simply by saying it is for impeachment); Id. at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring) (stating support
for validity of search for weapons, but “for all gang-related items . . . I would not award
qualified immunity to Messerschmidt and his colleagues for this aspect of their search”).
89
Id. at 1249 (“Whether any of these facts, standing alone or taken together, actually establish probable cause is a question we need not decide.”).
90
Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250.
91
Id. at 1249-50 (noting officers sought approval from a superior and a warrant).
92
Id. at 1249. PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Additionally, officers are typically given the
benefit of the doubt, because an officer may have acted unreasonably under the Fourth
Amendment but nevertheless, may be found to have acted reasonably for the purpose of
qualified immunity. See, e.g., Moore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding defendant’s actions were unreasonable in terms of the Fourth Amendment, but were
reasonable as to qualified immunity); see also Bendlin, supra note 40, at 1045 (“Currently,
the objective government official merely has to act in a way that is not ‘entirely unreasonable.’ ”). PROFESSOR BLUM: The fact that an officer got approval from a superior or a
warrant will count heavily towards granting qualified immunity but no one factor is determinative. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 345 (“We also reject petitioner’s argument that . . . the act of
applying for a warrant is per se objectively reasonable,”); see also Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct.
at 1249 (focusing on police officer defendant’s actions in obtaining a warrant). But see Groh
v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 (2004) (“[A] warrant may be so facially deficient . . . that the
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid” for the purposes of qualified
immunity (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted))). DEAN CHEMERINSKY: Thus, whether the officer is afforded qualified
88
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provide qualified immunity, this case certainly suggests that a warrant is given great weight in supporting a claim of qualified immunity, regardless of whether the Court determined the plaintiff had a
constitutional right violated.93 While avoiding the merits question of
whether, on the particular facts of the case, there was probable cause
to support the scope of the warrant issued, the Court made it clear
that reasonable conduct by the police will go a long way towards
supporting a finding of qualified immunity.94
In Reichle v. Howards,95 once again, the Court went directly
to the second prong. Mr. Howards was arrested after he approached
then-Vice President Cheney at a shopping mall in Colorado where
Cheney was making a public appearance.96 Howards criticized
Cheney’s policies, touched the Vice President on the shoulder,
walked away and was then questioned by secret service agents.97
When he falsely denied having touched the Vice President, Howards
was arrested.98 He sued the responsible secret service officers for violating his Fourth and First Amendment rights, claiming that his arrest was in retaliation for his critical comments about the Vice President.99 Ultimately, Howards did not challenge the determination that
there was no Fourth Amendment violation because probable cause
existed to arrest him “for making a materially false statement to a
federal official.”100 The federal agents, however, sought review of
the denial of qualified immunity with respect to Howards’ First
Amendment claim.101 The Tenth Circuit held that Howards had esimmunity turns on reasonableness: if the conduct is clearly unreasonable, even if a superior
approved it, qualified immunity will not be given. Malley, 475 U.S. at 345.
93
Justices Kagan, Sotomayor and Ginsburg all dissented.
94
See also Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 990, 992 (2012) (per curiam) (Without deciding the merits question, concluding that “reasonable police officers in petitioners’ position
could have come to the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permitted them to enter the
Huff residence if there was an objectively reasonable basis for fearing that violence was imminent.”).
95
132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
96
Id. at 2091.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 2092.
99
Id.
100
Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2092.
101
Id. Because federal agents were sued, the case was brought as a Bivens action, not a
Section 1983 action. While the Court “has recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officials for Fourth Amendment violations,” the Court in Reichle assumed
without deciding that a First Amendment violation could give rise to a claim under Bivens.
Id. at 2093 n.4.
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tablished a material factual dispute as to whether his arrest was motivated by an impermissible purpose and, if so, the law was clearly established in the Tenth Circuit that a retaliatory arrest was unlawful
even if supported by probable cause.102 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari “on two questions: whether a First Amendment retaliatory
arrest claim may lie despite the presence of probable cause to support
the arrest, and whether clearly established law at the time of Howards’ arrest so held.”103 Leaving the merits question undecided,104 the
Court held the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because
the law was not clearly established regarding First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims in cases where there was probable cause for the
arrest.105 Given the current circuit split on the merits question,106 the
Supreme Court will no doubt be urged to revisit the question of retaliatory arrests to clarify whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.107
B.

The Lower Courts’ Avoidance of the Merits
Inquiry

The extent of Pearson’s negative effect on the development
and clarification of constitutional rights is also apparent in lower
court decisions, which demonstrate the courts’ willingness to ignore
the merits question, leaving the constitutional issue for another day.
102

Id. at 2092.
Id. at 2093.
104
Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (electing to address only the second question).
105
Id.
106
See Randolph A. Robinson II, Policing the Police: Protecting Civil Remedies in Cases
of Retaliatory Arrest, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 499, 500 (2012) (stating in Reichle “the Court
punted on the more important legal issue, thereby insuring a continued circuit split . . . as to
the role that probable cause should play in civil suits for retaliatory arrests”).
107
For post-Reichle decisions, see, e.g., Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2013) (recognizing a First Amendment retaliatory “booking and jailing” claim even
where probable cause existed); Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 253 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding officer had qualified immunity “because neither our circuit nor the Supreme Court
has ‘recognized a First Amendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported
by probable cause’ ”); Storey v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 987, 997 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The court below found Storey’s arrest was lawful. It also found that when an arrest is lawful, ‘then there
is no but-for causation for a related tort requiring a retaliatory motive.’ Thus, the court applied qualified immunity and granted summary judgment. This result was consistent with
[Reichle].”); Veth Mam v. City of Fullerton, No. 8:11-cv-1242–JST (MLGx), 2013 WL
951401, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (noting that “the Ford decision makes it apparent
that Reichle has not cast doubt on the Ninth Circuit’s prior precedents holding that retaliatory
arrests supported by probable cause are actionable under § 1983”).
103
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For example, in Doninger v. Niehoff,108 the Second Circuit refused to
express an opinion as to whether there was a violation of a student’s
First Amendment free speech right when she was prohibited from
running for senior class secretary in response to a post on the Internet
regarding the possible cancellation of a student event and the superintendent’s involvement in the upset of plans.109 The court saw “no
need to decide”110 the question of whether the school officials violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights, because the First Amendment right
was not clearly established at the time.111
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Embody v. Ward112 left undecided the question of whether the Second Amendment provides a
right to bear arms within state parks.113 Where such a right was not
clearly established at the time of the arrest, the officer was entitled to
qualified immunity.114 And, in Hagans v. Franklin County Sherriff,115 involving a repeated tasing of an individual after he resisted
arrest,116 the court avoided the merits question: whether there was a
Fourth Amendment violation.117 The court held that the law governing taser use on a suspect who was resisting arrest was not clearly established, and as a result, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.118 Qualified immunity often arises in cases involving the use
of a taser, which is a relatively new technology with very little governing law, and consequently, some courts have jumped to the second
prong without resolving whether the use of the taser in the particular
situation was unlawful.119 Like the Supreme Court, lower courts too
108

642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 346.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
695 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012).
113
See id. at 581-82 (“No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right
to bear arms within state parks . . . . Such a right may or may not exist, but the critical point
for our purposes is that it has not been established—clearly or otherwise at this point. That
suffices to resolve this claim under the Court’s qualified-immunity precedents.”).
114
Id.
115
695 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2012). The court only determined that the police did not violate
a well settled law, declining to determine whether an individual has a Fourth Amendment
right against the police’s use of a taser. See id. at 508 (“We opt to answer the easier of the
two questions, saving the harder one for another day.”).
116
Id. at 507.
117
Id. at 508.
118
Id. at 511.
119
See, e.g., German v. Sosa, 399 F. App’x 554, 557 (11th Cir. 2010) (“No case, statute,
or principle within the Constitution provides the necessary precedent to clearly establish the
109
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have left constitutional issues unanswered as a result of Pearson.
C.

Answering the Merits Question Since Pearson

Not all courts have avoided the merits inquiry. In Mattos v.
Agarano,120 for example, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, confronted the question of whether the use of a taser violated the Fourth
Amendment in the contexts presented in the two cases consolidated
for en banc review. One case involved a seven-month pregnant
woman who was tased three times in drive stun mode for refusing to
sign the back of a speeding ticket.121 The plaintiff in the companion
case, a victim of domestic violence,122 was tased, apparently in dart
mode,123 when she tried to defuse the situation by stepping between
her husband and the police.124 The court held that both tasings conrights [plaintiff] claims were violated by the [defendant’s] use of a taser. Thus, qualified
immunity applies . . . .”); Russell v. Wright, No. 3:11-cv-00075, 2013 WL 74439, at *11
(W.D. Va. Jan. 4, 2013) (“Given the dearth of caselaw on the use of tasers in excessive
force cases, particularly within the Fourth Circuit, the court simply cannot say that Wright’s
use of his taser under these circumstances violated clearly established law. Tasers are still
relatively novel devices, and courts across the country continue to grapple with determining
their proper role in assisting law enforcement officers.”). But see Meyers v. Baltimore
Cnty,, No. 11-2192, 2013 WL 388125, at *8 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (“[T]he absence of a judicial decision holding that it is unlawful to use a taser repeatedly and unnecessarily under
similar circumstances does not prevent a court from denying a qualified immunity defense.”); Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 732 (“[W]e conclude that it was clearly
established on June 25, 2007, that it is unlawful to deploy a taser in dart mode against a nonviolent misdemeanant who had just been tased in dart mode and made no movement when,
after the first tasing, the officer instructed her to turn over.”); Austin v. Redford Twp. Police
Dept., 690 F.3d 490, 499 (6th Cir. 2012) (“ ‘Even without precise knowledge that the use of
the [t]aser would be a violation of a constitutional right,’ on these facts, Morgan ‘should
have known based on analogous cases that [his] actions were unreasonable.’ ”) (citation
omitted); Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 367 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[G]eneral constitutional principles against excessive force that were clearly established at the time of the incident between Deputy Eichenberger and Shekleton were such as to put a reasonable officer on
notice that tasering Shekleton under the circumstances as presented by Shekleton was excessive force in violation of the clearly established law.”); see generally Aaron Sussman, Shocking the Conscience: What Police Tasers and Weapon Technology Reveal About Excessive
Force Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1342, 1344 (2012).
120
661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
121
Id. at 436-37.
122
Id. at 438.
123
For a description of the difference between dart mode and drive stun mode, see, e.g.,
Abbott, 705 F.3d at 725. A major difference is that the use of the taser in dart mode will subject the victim to temporary paralysis of the muscles, overriding the victim’s central nervous
system. The use of the taser in drive stun mode inflicts temporary pain in order to achieve
compliance with the officer’s commands, but does not result in paralysis of the muscles. Id.
124
Mattos, 661 F.3d at 439.
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stituted a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, but the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law at the time
of both incidents was unclear as to what level of force was involved
with taser use, on what constituted a significant level of force, or under what circumstances a taser could be used.125
When a court of appeals addresses the merits question and declares a constitutional right has been violated, but the defendant prevails on the qualified immunity prong of the analysis, an interesting
problem is presented. May the defendant, the prevailing party in the
court below, seek review in the Supreme Court of the merits question
that was decided in the plaintiff’s favor? While the defendant officials whose conduct has been deemed unconstitutional are shielded
from liability in the case decided, future conduct under similar circumstances will be governed by the newly declared constitutional
standard and qualified immunity will not be afforded. For example,
in Mattos, police officials may not have agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the taser use was unconstitutional, even though
the officers were relieved of liability by a finding of qualified immunity.126
The Supreme Court provided instruction on this issue in
Camreta v. Greene.127 In Camreta, a police officer and a social
worker removed a child from her classroom to investigate suspected
abuse at home.128 The issue was whether this “seizure” and questioning required a warrant under the Fourth Amendment or whether an
exception applied due to the school setting.129 The Ninth Circuit held
that regular Fourth Amendment doctrine applied, thereby requiring a
warrant to remove a child from the classroom and interrogate her.130
Nevertheless, the social worker and police officer were given qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established.131 Subsequently, the defendants, despite prevailing, sought review in the Su125

Id at 452.
See generally id. (deciding first prong in favor of plaintiff, but granting qualified immunity based on second prong).
127
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). The Court addressed the question of whether “government
officials who prevail on grounds of qualified immunity [may] obtain our review of a court of
appeals’ decision that their conduct violated the Constitution . . . .” Id. at 2026; see also id.
at 2030 (“As a matter of practice and prudence, we have generally declined to consider cases
at the request of a prevailing party . . . .”).
128
Id. at 2027.
129
Id. at 2026.
130
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027.
131
Id.
126
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preme Court as to the holding that a warrant is required under such
circumstances.132
The Supreme Court held that on rare occasions it will grant
certiorari to review the merits question, even though the appealing
parties prevailed below.133 However, the Court emphasized that the
holding only applied to its own authority to hear such appeals, not the
circuit courts.134 Circuit courts need not review district court opinions at the behest of defendants who have prevailed on qualified immunity, even if such opinions err on the merits question, because district court opinions do not carry the same precedential authority as
opinions from the courts of appeals, and thus cannot serve to clearly
establish the law.135 Therefore, although courts may be avoiding the
merits inquiry with ever-greater frequency, attorneys should be aware
of the precedent that may be created by a circuit court’s adverse ruling on the merits question, even if qualified immunity is ultimately
granted. In Camreta, the Court signaled a willingness to review such
constitutional determinations.
IV.

THE STANDARD FOR ASCERTAINING “CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED LAW”

Because qualified immunity is entwined with the question of
whether there was “clearly established law” at the time of the challenged action to put a reasonable official on notice that his or her
conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it is obviously
important to figure out what makes the law “clearly established.”
First, there is the question of what law controls. In Wilson v.
Layne,136 news reporters on a police ride-along were invited to enter a
citizen’s home during a police search, which was authorized by a
warrant.137 In this pre-Pearson case, the Supreme Court first addressed the merits inquiry: whether it was unconstitutional for the po132

Id.
Id. at 2032. In this particular case, the issue turned out to be moot because by the time
it reached the Supreme Court the child was no longer a child, but had already grown and
moved out of the state and clearly would not be subjected to such conduct again. In light of
its finding of mootness, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s holding on the merits. Id. at
2035-36.
134
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033 (“We emphasize, however, two limits of today’s holding.
First, it addresses only our own authority to review cases in this procedural posture.”).
135
Wheeler v. City of Lansing, 660 F.3d 931, 940 (6th Cir. 2011).
136
526 U.S. 603 (1999).
137
Id. at 607.
133
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lice to bring the news reporters into the home of a private citizen.138
The Court unanimously held that bringing reporters into a private
home, even when the police entry was authorized by a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment “when the presence of the third parties
in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.” 139 With
only Justice Stevens dissenting,140 the Court went on to conclude that,
despite the finding of a constitutional violation by a unanimous
Court, the law was not clearly established at the time of the incident
such that a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.141 The Court framed the issue as the
objective question of “whether a reasonable officer could have believed that bringing members of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of clearly established
law and the information the officers possessed.”142 The Court concluded that general Fourth Amendment principles did not apply with
obvious clarity to the officers’ conduct in this case.143 Furthermore,
“[p]etitioners [had] not brought to [the Court’s] attention any cases of
controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident
which clearly established the rule on which they [sought] to rely, nor
[had] they identified a consensus of cases of persuasive authority
such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions
were lawful.”144 Thus, absent any pertinent Supreme Court or controlling circuit court decision or a consensus of persuasive authority
from other circuits, the Court concluded that the law was not clearly
established such that reasonable officers would have understood that,
under these circumstances, entering the house with the reporters violated the Fourth Amendment.145 While most circuits will consider a
consensus of persuasive authority from other circuits in the absence
of controlling precedent,146 both the Second and Eleventh Circuits
138

Id. at 609, 611.
Id. at 614.
140
Id. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141
Wilson, 525 U.S. at 615.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 615-16.
144
Id. at 617.
145
Id. at 617-18.
146
See, e.g., McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(stating it is appropriate for courts to look to other circuits when neither the Fifth Circuit nor
the Supreme Court has spoken); Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth & Their Families, 274
F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2001) (instructing courts to “look not only to Supreme Court precedent
but to all available case law” in determining the contours of a right); Medina v. City of Den139
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have expressed disapproval of such an approach.147
Once the relevant source of “clearly established law” has been
determined, the more difficult task is figuring out what is required to
make the law “clearly established.” It is on this issue that most of the
debate takes place, and what has become clear is that the framing of
the question may be determinative of the answer.
One problem with negotiating the clearly-established-law terrain is that the Supreme Court, in earlier cases, sent mixed signals as
to what is sufficient to give officials notice that certain conduct is unconstitutional. In Saucier v. Katz, Hope v. Pelzer,148 and Brosseau v.
Haugen,149 the Supreme Court addressed the problem of defining the
contours of the right in the Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment contexts. In Saucier, the Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to
construe the clearly established law standard more narrowly and to
frame the contours of the right that must be found clearly with more
attention to the particular facts of the case before the court. 150 Asking
whether it was clearly established that unreasonable use of force violates the Fourth Amendment is framing the question too broadly.151
In Hope, the plaintiff alleged that he was handcuffed to a hitching
post for seven hours in the hot sun, without bathroom breaks and with
no or very little water.152 The Eleventh Circuit held that the alleged
conduct violated the Eighth Amendment, but affirmed the district
ver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[T]here must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or [there must be] clearly established weight of authority from other
courts . . . .”). See also Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998) (“In the
absence of binding precedent, a court should look to all available decisional law, including
decisions of state courts, other circuits, and district courts.” (quoting Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1993))).
147
See Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (denying law was clearly established, without looking to other circuits, “because neither this court nor the Supreme Court
had recognized such a right at that time”); see also Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323
F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[O]nly Supreme Court cases, Eleventh Circuit caselaw, and
Georgia Supreme Court caselaw can ‘clearly establish’ law in this circuit.”); Marsh v. Butler
Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1032 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (“When case law is needed to ‘clearly establish’ the law applicable to the pertinent circumstances, we look to decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest
court of the pertinent state.”).
148
536 U.S. 730 (2002).
149
543 U.S. 194 (2004).
150
See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200 (“[T]he question whether the right was clearly established
must be considered on a more specific level than recognized by the [Ninth Circuit] Court of
Appeals.”).
151
Id. at 201-02.
152
Hope, 526 U.S. at 734-35.
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court’s grant of qualified immunity on the clearly-established-law
prong of the analysis.153 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that the plaintiff had
asserted a violation of the Eighth Amendment.154 The Court reversed, however, as to the grant of qualified immunity, admonishing
the court of appeals for its overly rigid approach to the qualified immunity analysis.155 The Court instructed the Eleventh Circuit to construe the clearly-established-law standard more liberally, rejecting the
requirement of a case on point,156 instead stating that all that was required was “fair warning” that the challenged conduct was unconstitutional.157
The Court’s language in Hope is clearly more “plaintifffriendly,” but since that decision, the “fair warning” formula has been
virtually ignored by the Supreme Court.158 For example, in Brosseau,
the Court addressed just the second prong of the analysis and summarily reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the defendant officer because the plaintiff could point to no case that “squarely governed” the situation confronting Officer Brosseau in that case,
“whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture through
vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are a risk from
that flight.”159 More significantly, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,160 the Supreme Court recently raised the bar for plaintiffs to overcome the
clearly-established-law hurdle. The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, added the “every reasonable” phrase to the clearly established law test, surreptitiously changing the game when nobody was
looking.161
Thus, defendants seeking qualified immunity will now proffer
the Al-Kidd formulation of the test and argue that “ ‘a government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when at the time of

153

Id. at 735-36.
Id. at 737.
155
Id. at 739.
156
Id. at 739, 741.
157
Hope, 526 U.S. at 741.
158
See generally Daniel K. Siegel, Clearly Established Enough: The Fourth Circuit’s
New Approach to Qualified Immunity in Bellotte v. Edwards, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1252
(2012) (discussing the modern trend among the circuits to require a case on point for law to
be clearly established).
159
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200-01.
160
131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
161
Id. at 2083.
154
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the challenged conduct the contours of the right are sufficiently clear’
that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that was he is
doing violates that right.’ ”162 The language “a reasonable official”
was replaced and is now “every reasonable official,”163 a major
change in the stringency of the clearly-established-law test.164 The
Court further explained that the “existing precedent must have placed
the statute or constitutional question beyond debate.”165 Lower courts
have taken note of the Supreme Court’s conflicting messages and the
current Court’s raising of the qualified immunity bar. In a post-AlKidd en banc decision, Morgan v. Swanson,166 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit granted qualified immunity to elementary school
principals who restricted the distribution of written religious materials in public elementary schools.167 Writing for the majority of the en
banc panel, Judge Benevides made the following observations:
The Al-Kidd Court, in admonishing lower
courts “not to define clearly established law at a high
level of generality,” did not discuss or even cite Hope,
nor other earlier opinions reflecting a similar concern
that a damages remedy be available for “obvious” or
flagrant constitutional violations. This silence is puzzling given that Al-Kidd reversed a Ninth Circuit decision denying immunity in reliance on Hope. Adding

162

Id. (emphasis added).
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (“[O]ur cases establish that the
right the official is alleged to violate must have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”); see
also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore hold that government
officials . . . are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”) (emphasis added).
164
Although it is surprising that no Justice opposed this addition, it is not clear whether
they were unaware of the addition or they actually agreed with it. See generally Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074. While sitting in the Second Circuit, Justice Sotomayor wrote a
concurrence touching on this distinction. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 169 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Whether reasonably competent officers could disagree about
the lawfulness of the conduct at issue, however, is not the same question the Supreme Court
has repeatedly instructed us to consider: whether ‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his [or her] conduct was unlawful in the situation he [or she] confronted.’ ”) (citing
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202) (emphasis in original).
165
Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
166
659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
167
Id. at 382.
163
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to the perplexity is that, in its next major “clearly established” opinion after Hope, the Supreme Court
granted qualified immunity because there were no
cases that “squarely govern[ed].” That said, this case
does not call on us to decide whether the Court’s
statements in Hope survive Al-Kidd: the constitutional
issue in this case is far from “beyond debate,” as evidenced by a large body of oft-conflicting case law and
the variety of opinion among members of this Court.
We leave for another day the question of whether and
when a constitutional violation may be so “obvious”
that its illegality is clear from only a generalized
statement of law.168
DEAN CHEMERINSKY: The heightened standard is facially
apparent in the test’s phrasing. The Harlow standard for thirty years
focused on whether it was clearly established law that “a” reasonable
officer should know; now it must be law that “every” reasonable officer should know.169 Now, after Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, it must be a
right that is beyond dispute.170 Why did no Justice challenge this?
Perhaps it was that Justice Scalia did not call attention to the shift and
the other Justices simply did not notice the change in the law.171
Therefore, courts are able to grant qualified immunity and
dismiss Section 1983 claims by requiring an exact case on point from
a high level court and the recently implemented heightened standard
for proving a clearly established law.

168

Id. at 373 (footnotes omitted). See also Mattos, 661 F.3d at 448 (“We cannot conclude . . . that ‘every ‘reasonable official would have understood’ . . . beyond debate’ that
tasing Brooks in these circumstances constituted excessive force.”); De Contreras v. City of
Rialto, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1252 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“The Supreme Court recently emphasized the high burden that must be met for a plaintiff to overcome qualified immunity, replacing Anderson’s language of ‘a reasonable official’ with ‘every reasonable official’ and
stating that ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’ ”). But see Morgan, 659 F.3d at 393 (Dennis, J., specially concurring in parts
and not joining in other parts) (“The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Camreta v.
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011), and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011), do not
overrule Hope, Lanier, or any case in that line.”).
169
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (requiring a reasonable person); see also Al-Kidd, 131 S.
Ct. at 2083 (requiring every reasonable official).
170
Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
171
See generally id.
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CONCLUSION

PROFESSOR BLUM: Looking through any lens, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Roberts Court is strongly proimmunity. The scope of absolute immunity has been expanded to include prosecutors engaged in administrative functions172 and witnesses before grand juries.173 With respect to qualified immunity, it appears the Court is ready to afford the protection to various categories
of private actors working with government officials, and Richardson
will be confined to its facts.174 The standard for determining when
the law is clearly established has been ratcheted up. Hope, while not
overruled, is largely ignored or distinguished by both the Supreme
Court and lower courts. Beyond the issue of how one determines
whether the law is clearly established, many other questions regarding the qualified immunity defense to Section 1983 claims remain
unanswered.175 For litigators in this area, it is imperative to keep up
with the many twists and turns that may result from Supreme Court
cases that often confuse more than clarify the issues. One thing is
certainly clearly established. Whether you represent plaintiffs or de172

Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344.
Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1506.
174
Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1667.
175
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: One of the biggest issues that is unresolved is, does qualified immunity protect reasonable mistakes of fact. See generally Karen Blum, Qualified
Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A Practical Application of § 1983 as It Applies to
Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21 TOURO L. REV. 571, 577-78, 591-92 (2005).
There is Supreme Court authority that it protects only reasonable mistakes of law; however,
Justice Kennedy wrote in dissent that it also protects reasonable mistakes of fact. See, e.g.,
Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (“While the constitutional
violation prong concerns the reasonableness of the officer’s mistake of fact, the clearly established prong concerns the reasonableness of the officer’s mistake of law.”). But see Groh,
540 U.S. at 567 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our qualified immunity doctrine applies regardless of whether the officer’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based
on mixed questions of law and fact.”). See also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009).
PROFESSOR BLUM: Additionally, issues of the role of the judge and the jury as fact finders also arise when there is a dispute regarding qualified immunity and there are material
facts that have to be decided by the jury. If the case goes to the jury, there should be special
interrogatories given to the jury on the questions of fact. Although the judge ultimately decides the question of law, that decision will be based on the jury’s findings of fact; thus, factual, detailed and specific questions are essential—general interrogatories are not helpful.
See Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To the extent that a particular
finding of fact is essential to a determination by the court that the defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity, it is the responsibility of the defendant to request that the jury be asked
the pertinent question.”).
173
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fendants in these cases, you have a tough job, and staying on top of
the law, as murky as it may be, is essential.
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